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The standard approach to conceptual understanding in the case of autism uses the 
distinction of abstract versus concrete thinking. This approach has its benefits but fails to 
explain all features of language use. For example, some concepts change their meaning 
in different contexts in contrast to concepts that are more rigid in their uses, such as 
mathematical concepts. This idea has its background in Minimalist theory of fiction 
(MTF), a theory that considers ‘skills to use words’ essential for understanding fiction, 
contrasting with theories that require pretending or make believe to understand fiction. 
From this background, the theory of Integrative Complexity (IC), and the method 
animating for practice, ICthinking®, can be of particular use to autistic people. The 
interventions develop meta-cognitive skills and are supportive of autistic people. From 
these starting points, we introduce new research hypotheses for developing educational 
methods especially for autistic people. 
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1. Changing contexts 
 
Fictional characters raise philosophical problems because of their ontological status. If we 
follow the traditional theories of meaning and reference, names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
are problematic: is Sherlock Holmes real or imaginary or both? Similarly, stories 
involving our heroes like Luke Skywalker or Lara Croft are a challenge for philosophers 
who insist on there being some referent in real life in order to make statements with truth 
value, that is, evaluated as ‘true’ or ‘false’. What makes the situation even more 
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complicated is that these stories include statements that are actually true in real life (a 
particular poison does kill in a particular way). Approaches to these problems range from 
more straightforward traditional answers offered in classic texts by Gottlob Frege (1892) 
and Bertrand Russell (1905) to complicated systems of existence like Alexius Meinong’s 
(1905) account and its further developments in Edward Zalta’s (1983) and Terence 
Parson’s (1980, 2000) theory on abstract objects. There is an obvious need for making a 
difference between fictional and real-life objects. The answers following Meinong try to 
save the idea of referent by considering different levels of existence. Another recent and 
widely accepted way to deal with fiction is to apply the concept of make believe or 
pretenseii (e.g. Walton 1990, Currie 1990 and Evans 1982). In the case of fictional or 
abstract objects, we are invited to make believe (or pretend) their existence.  
 All these approaches have their pros and cons but a new alternative with useful 
applications to different fields is offered by the Minimalist Theory of Fiction (MTF) 
(Nyberg 2015, 2016, 2018). MTF takes its point of view from use theory of meaning and 
minimal theory of truthiii. It stresses the recognition of different uses of words i.e. 
language games. Fiction, all abstract objects, scientific use of language, everyday uses of 
language are all the same in that each context has its own rules for the right uses of words. 
If we change the focus from ontological matters (is this true or false) to a context-
appropriate use of words we can concentrate on developing skills like reading social and 
contextual cues and metacognition. Attention can then be paid to metarepresentation and 
metacognitive skills: to develop metacognitive skills it is essential to use educational 
practices that require metarepresentation, the second-order presentation of first order 
cognitive contentsiv (a drawing is a representation of something and someone looking at 
the drawing represents it in their mind).  
 Pretence is apparently involved when we are participating in, for example, a play 
where we are exaggerating our feelings in order to convincingly perform the characters. 
However, for our performance to be convincing we must understand what is going on in 
that particular context, the play. Thus, understanding precedes pretending. On the other 
hand, there are games or language games where we adjust our behavior to the context 
without necessarily knowingly doing so (without understanding). In general, pretense is 
defined as acting in a way that is contrary to how the world is. Pretending by its definition 
(e.g. Garvey 1990) requires acting symbolically, or non-literally, in a way that is contrary 
to reality. In developmental psychology, a challenging question is when exactly do 
children actually start pretending? Pretense seems to emerge during the second year of 
life and it is considered puzzling that it emerges so early, at the same time as children are 
constructing their own concepts of the world and reality (Randell & Nielsen 2007).  
 
ii Pretence theories about fiction claim we are merely pretending the truth of the sentences or the existence 
of the objects involved in fiction. Kendall Walton’s theory is allegedly the most influential one of the 
pretense theories. In his theory representational works function as props in games of make believe just like 
dolls and toy trucks serve as props in children’s games. (Walton 1990).      
iii See Horwich 1998a, 1998b and Wittgenstein 1999. 
iv E.g. Proust 2007. 
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 Accordingly, pretense is understood to play a significant role in children’s social 
cognitive development. In practice, this means, for example, playing games where objects 
can stand in for other unrelated objects thus requiring a lot of imagination (a broom 
becomes a horse, or a cardboard box a ship to outer space) Randell and Nielsen (2007, 
128) Leslie (1987). There is no reason to question these important stages of psychological 
development but what is disputable is the nature of pretend play. Pretend play is seen as 
a developmental landmark in the child’s acquisition of a ‘Theory of Mindv’ (Leslie, 1987). 
There is a wide discussion questioning Leslie’s (1987) view on pretend play and in 
general the result of this discussion is that there are different types and levels of pretend 
play, and that all pretense is not metarepresentational (e.g. Gordon 1986, 1992, Goldman 
1989, Nyberg 2015, 2016). Looking at these processes from the perspective of the language 
user, we do not take a stance on questions concerning theory of mind but ask instead 
what kind of skills are required when pretense is going on. For the purposes of this 
discussion, it is important to note that autistic children usually show low levels of pretend 
playvi. In the remaining sections, we will begin to explore using the theory Integrative 
Complexity (IC) and its further development by IC Thinking researchers to discover new 
methods for improving the language skills of autistic children. 
 
2. Integrative complexity 
 
Integrative complexity is simultaneously a concept and a measure based on over forty 
years of research. Pioneered by Suedfeld and Tetlockvii the integrative complexity (IC) 
measurement frame analyses the level of cognitive complexity in a spoken or written 
statement, emphasizing structure over content. As a concept, IC refers to the cognitive 
lens through which human beings view the social world during real or perceived conflict. 
When faced with disagreement or difference relating to issues core to our values and 
identity, the social world can be perceived through a narrow, restricted lens resulting in 
black and white thinking (Low IC). In contrast, it is possible to engage with the social 
world – even when faced with threat or disagreement - with a more deliberate, flexible 
thinking style while remaining connected to our most important values and identity. This 
expansive thinking style supports peaceful solutions (High IC). The IC Thinking 
Research Group operationalized the concept of IC by designing a range of interventions 





v By ‘Theory of Mind’ is referred to the “ability to reason and make inferences about another’s mental states, 
and presupposes the ability to hold beliefs about another’s beliefs, or to mentally represent another’s 
mental representation”. 
vi E.g. Chris Jarrold & al. 1994. 
vii See e.g. (Suedfeld & Rank 1976, Suedfeld & Tetlock 1977, Suedfeld, Tetlock & Ramirez 1977, Suedfeld, 
Tetlock & Streufert 1992). 
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3. Finding rules and playing games 
 
Adapting an approach that focuses on the language user, we will view pretense as a 
metarepresentational positionviii. However, we can dispense with the concepts of pretense 
or make believe because they are mainly about acting against our beliefs. Rather than 
interpreting early signs of pretense in children’s development as knowingly acting in a 
way contrary to reality, we will focus on their ability to play the language game in 
question, or put another way, their skills to use language. For our argument, what is 
essential in pretense is the ability to use words differently in different contexts. We can 
understand a fictional story without knowingly viewing its statements as contrary to 
reality, although we have a better understanding of the story if we do recognize its 
relationship to other language games, for example, to those about reality. The better 
understanding of the different uses of the words the more interpretations are available 
(Nyberg 2015, 2016, 2018). In our view, this is undoubtedly linked to 
metarepresentational abilities and metacognition. Recognizing and comparing different 
language games or interpretations of a story requires metarepresentation and 
metacognitive abilities.  
 It is a familiar claim that autistic children lack a "theory of mind" because of an 
inability to metarepresent. In this claim, the skills to use language are determinative and 
the failure to recognize different uses of the same word in the same event is interpreted 
as an inability to metarepresent or imagine. While metarepresentation and imagination 
may be involved, focusing instead on the use of language (rather than theory of mind) 
may yield new insights for educational practices that will improve language skills and 
metacognitive abilities. Traditional approaches to investigating the thinking of autistic 
children do not take into account a language user’s position. In test situations participants 
are asked to interpret the meanings of words used in an experimental scenario. Taking 
into account an autistic participant’s point of view will offer new insights. For example, 
the well-known Sally–Anne test represents an experimental scenario that be looked at as 
a collection of multiple language games in which recognizing right uses of words is 
essential. 
 As a traditional test to investigate "theory of mind" in autistic children, the Sally-
Anne Test is used in developmental psychology to measure a person's social cognitive 
ability to attribute false beliefs to others. It has been used to identify how some autistic 
 
viii This is a problematic position since it is disputable whether early signs of pretense play is 
metarepresentational. In Nyberg 2016 it is argued that it is possible to fulfil the characteristics of pretense 
play without being aware of it. This is possible in the light of MTF. Thus, the claim that pretense play is 
metarepresentational means here that one states knowingly false claims and in addition adjusts feelings to 
this context.  
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childrenix have difficulty understanding other people's perspectives and was famously 
implemented by Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie, and Uta Frith (1985)x.  
 In the Sally-Anne experiment as described by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) two dolls 
were presented to children Sally and Anne: “First, we checked that the children knew 
which doll was which (Naming Question). Sally first placed a marble into her basket. 
Then she left the scene, and the marble was transferred by Anne and hidden in her box. 
Then, when Sally returned, the experimenter asked the critical Belief Question: “Where 
will Sally look for her marble?”. If the children point to the previous location of the 
marble, then they pass the Belief Question by appreciating the doll’s now false belief. If 
however, they point to the marble’s current location, then they fail the question by not 
taking into account the doll’s belief. These conclusions are warranted if two control 
questions are answered correctly: “Where is the marble really?” (Reality Question); 
“Where was the marble in the beginning? (Memory Question).” 
 If we compare this situation (the scene with Sally hiding the marble etc.) to a 
particular ICthinking® session where participants take different positions in written 
statements and subsequently IC coders evaluate what has been written in order to assign 
an IC score, then we can see crucial resemblances. Looking at things from different 
perspectives represents an understanding that words can be used differently, that is, 
words change their meanings depending on the context and all have less than full 
understandings of the possible variations in how words may be used. Consider for 
example the theme of emotions and human relations. A component of ICthinking 
interventions involves facilitating participants to take on the roles of subjects who hold 
different perspectives on a make- believe situation, rooted in real-world social issues. 
This experience requires that participants navigate multiple layers of meaningxi. 
Participants must understand a) the overall story of the imaginary scenario, b) that they 
have to play a role, not themselves, c) the character of the role that they are inhabiting in 
the scenario, d) that others are playing roles also, and e) that there are implicit or explicit 
connections between the imaginary scenario and ‘real world’ conflicts. This explicit 
connection – between the role play and the ‘real world’ social conflict – is not necessary 
in order to successfully participate in the game and demonstrates that although role plays 
rely on the capacity of participants to understand and engage in the use of language 
games such understanding exists across a spectrum (Nyberg 2018). Crucially, role play 
also supports embodied cognition – beyond language. In IC Thinking interventions, 
participants are facilitated to make explicit language-based connections between 
 
ix “The Belief Question for both trials was answered consistently by each child with the sole exception of 
one Down’s Syndrome child who failed trial 1 and passed trial 2. The results for Down’s Syndrome and 
normal subjects were strikingly similar. 23 out of 27 normal children, and 12 out of 14 Down’s Syndrome 
children passed the Belief Question on both trials (85% and 86% respectively). By contrast, 16 of the 20 
autistic children (80%) failed the Belief Question on both trials. “ Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie, and 
Uta Frith (1985) 
x Leslie and Frith (1988) found similar results with a similar experiment with human actors (rather than 
dolls). 
xi See Nyberg 2015 and 2018 on intertextuality. General introduction in Still, J. & Worton M. 1991. 
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integrative complexity, the role play scenario, their role, and the embodied experience of 
their thoughts, feelings and emotions (Boyd-MacMillan et al 2016, p.61). 
 Conceptions of human relations vary greatly between cultures and even families. 
One goal in IC thinking interventions is to become aware of this. What this means from 
the perspective of MTF is that in a case of misunderstanding there is a conflict because of 
different uses of words, i.e., different ideas about words’ meanings. The participants are 
playing different language games. The same phenomenon is present when autistic 
childrenxii fail in the Sally-Anne test. The idea of ‘theory of mind’ is one way to look at 
what is happening in the Sally-Anne test, but it can also be thought of as an ability to 
recognize different language games. It is crucial to recognize different uses of words 
manifested in the same context. These subgames may be called micro language games 
belonging to a macro language gamexiii. The rules of the games are constructed from social 
situations where cues are collected from multiple factors. MTF is about right uses of 
words and it highlights that mastering the use of a word is a skill and thus a matter of a 
degree. In MTF the concept of truth is essential since it indicates recognition of a 
metarepresentational position. Taking metarepresentational positions is one important 
developmental milestone, but equally important are the skills to use words. In the case 
of autism, it is a familiar phenomenon that children can be rather good in mathematics 
despite difficulties in other uses of language. In mathematics, the uses of the terms are 
more rigid than in everyday use of language. Their meanings do not change when the 
context changes. In everyday uses of language, the meanings are often constructed in 
situations where a great amount of contextual information is needed in order to follow 
the rules of the language game that determines the right meanings of those words in that 
context, i.e., how the words are being used. If this line of reasoning is correct, then it 
implies that understanding mathematics does not essentially require either pretending 
or meta-representational capacity or following context specific, meaning constituting, 
rules.  
 It seems that the way autistic children use all kinds of concepts is similar to the 
way they use mathematical concepts. This suggests that the process where the use of a 
concept is learnt is particularly crucial in the case of autism since it is connected to a rigid 
use of words. This causes problems not only because meanings vary in different contexts 
but also because there can be many contexts, that is many language games present in one 
conversation. If one way of using a word is determinative, then it prevents recognizing 
alternative, legitimate uses, i.e., other perspectives. While ‘theory of mind’ is one way to 
understand what is happening, it does not explain or describe the great differences that 
can exist among children in their grasp of the meanings of words, what we have been 
referring to as skills to use words. One may of course argue whether theory of mind or 
skills to use words is the determinative factor, but our argument is that exploring the role 
 
xii 'autistic people have been shown to prefer 'identity-first' language' see Dunn and Andrews 2015; Kenney 
et al 2016; Botha et al, 2021' 
xiii For example a discussion can be about Christianity (macro language game) with different language 
games going on depending on the orientation (micro language game). 
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of language skills and the process whereby the uses of words are learnt may lead to new 
educational practices that increase skills for managing in different situations. 
 The right use of the word marble in Sally-Anne test is dependent on which 
language game is in question. The description of the test uses three different names of the 
contexts; the ‘belief’ question, the ‘reality’ question and the ‘memory’ question. What this 
requires from the language user is the recognition that the rules are different in those 
games. This learning is facilitated in IC Thinking interventions. Recognizing that 
different language users are using words differently is a key to differentiation, the first 
step in IC flexibility.  
 
4. Future research 
 
Areas for future research include firstly the development or enhancement of 
interventions to increase IC flexibility which place even greater emphasis on 
participatory methods. These methods should provide mechanisms for learning that rely 
less on the use of language games (involved in both verbally and socially-cued non-verbal 
communication). This could include the development and use of participatory visual 
methods which have been suggested as efficacious in supporting researchers to access 
insights ‘which would be difficult to perceive and understand through words (and 
numbers) alone’ (Hickmann, 2007, p.322. See also Bagnoli, 2009, Mannay, Staples and 
Edwards, 2017).  
 Secondly, we suggest that adaptations to the IC coding manual are required to be 
inclusive of autistic people. This would involve a) a process through which to baseline 
the language capabilities of participants before administration of the IC measurement 
framework and b) in line with our suggestions above, adaptations to the current coding 
regime which are capacious enough to incorporate participatory visual and movement-
based demonstrations of integrative complexity which do not rely on usage of language 
games.  
 Finally, we suggest that the differences in language use we have explored here 
may be evidenced empirically using the existing, unmodified IC coding manual. 
Specifically, we suggest further investigation may suggest that autistic people exhibit a 
particular IC profile. We hypothesise that autistic people may exhibit higher levels of 
elaborative complexity (complexly elaborated viewpoint on one perspective) than 
dialectical complexity (presence of a tension between more than one perspective) 
(Conway et al, 2008).  
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